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 11. No Concretion without God 
 
Palmyre Oomen (Nijmegen) 
0. Introduction 
The eleventh chapter of Whitehead’s Science and the Modern World is 
concerned with “the puzzling fact that there is an actual course of events” 
(172). Whitehead calls this fact ‘puzzling’ because that actual course in 
itself is a concrete and limited fact, that metaphysically speaking might 
have been otherwise than it is. Thus, immediately after a chapter on 
“Abstraction,” dealing primarily with possibilities, Whitehead wants to 
address in the present chapter the issue of “the concrete,” i.e., that which 
has contingently grown together, which is none other than actual occasions 
and their actual course. And he entitles this chapter “God,” in order to 
express his philosophical conviction that the explanation for the puzzling 
fact in question is God, for without God there can be no concretion. 
My presentation and analysis of Chapter XI will focus on Whitehead’s 
concept of an actual occasion as a twofold togetherness, on his concept of 
God as required for concretion, and on the interrelation between those two 
topics. 
1. Whitehead’s Metaphysical Attitude 
Whitehead begins with a discussion of Aristotle, “the greatest 
metaphysician,” an expression Whitehead uses primarily on account of the 
fact that Aristotle was “entirely dispassionate” inasmuch as he created a 
metaphysics without being influenced by ethical or religious interests. 
Thus, the only reason for Aristotle to introduce the concept of (God as) the 
Prime Mover was, according to Whitehead, none other than the 
metaphysical train of thought that led him to that concept without being 
influenced by religious interests (173). 
Clearly, Whitehead’s intention is to adopt a similar course of thinking. He 
too wants to be metaphysically dispassionate (PR 343). He too thinks that 
there is a metaphysical need for an entity at the base of all actual things. In 
Science and the Modern World, he calls this the required “Principle of 
Concretion” (174; also in Process and Reality: PR 244, 345) or a required 
“principle of limitation” (178), whereas in Adventure of Ideas, he will 
phrase his insight as: “The Platonic ‘persuasion’ is required” (AI 115). 
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It is important to understand what Whitehead means by ‘requirement.’ It 
might sound as a ‘God of the gaps’ reasoning. However, Whitehead 
explicitly intends not to follow that erroneous way of arguing. Indeed, he 
chides Descartes precisely for using God as the big metaphysical 
‘exception’ for no other reason than to save his metaphysical system. 
Without the metaphysical exception of God, Descartes’ system was bound 
to disintegrate (PR 49, 190). Nevertheless, Whitehead too requires God in 
his metaphysics. What then is the difference? According to Whitehead, 
Descartes tries to avoid inconsistency by assuming that God has the 
function of sustaining the world, but he does so without being able to make 
intelligible from within his system why God should want to fulfill that 
function: “Descartes tells us that they [=the bodily substances] are 
sustained by God, but fails to give any reason why God should care to do 
so” (FR 30). Thus, Descartes places God outside the metaphysical system. 
Whitehead too requires God but, contrary to Descartes, he gives formal 
reasons from within his metaphysical principles why God does what he 
does. This is why he so strongly emphasizes that God is the ‘chief 
exemplification’ of the metaphysical principles, and not a stopgap to be 
used to save the collapse of metaphysical principles (PR 343). 
2. Aristotle’s Prime Mover, Newton’s Law of Inertia and 
Whitehead’s Principle of Concretion 
Aristotle’s postulation of a Prime Mover was based on a cosmology we 
now judge to be erroneous. In his view, special causes were required in 
order to sustain the motion of material things. However, Newton’s famous 
Law of Inertia, also known as the First Law of Motion which states that 
every body continues in its state of rest or of uniform-motion-in-a-straight-
line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it, 
proved this to be incorrect. 
Nonetheless, Whitehead argues that, even though Aristotle’s argument is 
formally incorrect, our generally accepted thinking suffers from a 
metaphysical problem that is analogous to the problem Aristotle raises, and 
that the solution to this problem must be analogous to Aristotle’s solution. 
In Whitehead’s words: “In the place of Aristotle’s God as Prime Mover, we 
require God as the Principle of Concretion” (174). However, in order to 
understand this, we must first come to a better understanding of the 
problem. 
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3. The Actual Occasion as Twofold Synthesis 
In order to elucidate the metaphysical problem to which the Principle of 
Concretion is meant to provide the solution, we must examine the 
implications of Whiteheads ideas regarding an actual occasion and about 
the course of actual occasions. For Whitehead, every actual occasion fuses 
into unity the many elements that are offered to it. Such ‘growing together’ 
may be considered in two ways: as the achievement of a togetherness of all 
actual occasions, and as the achievement of a togetherness of eternal 
objects (175). How is this twofold synthesis to be understood? 
The integration of past actual occasions into the new actual occasions may 
be compared with, for instance, something like the self-creation of a mosaic 
picture out of a certain available set of mosaic pieces (or to use an 
illustration with less substantivistic connotations: the self-composition of a 
piece of music from a certain set of tones). This, admittedly very 
inadequate, comparison may help elucidate the following two different but 
interdependent aspects. 
On the one hand, the past actual occasions function as prehensible 
‘mosaic pieces’ from which a new synthesis, the new ‘mosaic,’ will arise. 
However, even though each of those ‘pieces’ will inevitably occupy some 
place, the question ‘how’ (what kind of place) is still open. In other words, 
the entities are not synthesized into a merely unqualified aggregate. If that 
were the case, there could only be one creature, as Whitehead emphasizes 
(RM 90). Indeed, though each new composition, i.e., each new creature, 
accepts (“feels”) the data given to it, the how of these feelings is not fully 
determined by the data themselves. The process of self-creation just entails 
the elimination of the indetermination of these ‘hows’ (in Whitehead’s later 
terminology “the subjective forms” of these feelings). That is to say, the 
self-creation of an actual occasion requires that the ‘how’ of each feeling 
becomes definite in respect to the eternal objects with which feeling clothes 
itself (PR 85-86). And thus, on the other hand, the synthesis of the new 
creature may also be regarded as the harmonization of different ‘hows,’ 
that is to say of the eternal objects which determine how the entities are felt 
and integrated (cf. RM 90). 
This enables us to understand that according to Whitehead, an actual 
occasion is the realization of a twofold “togetherness,” a togetherness of 
actual occasions as well as of eternal objects (174). He calls the realization 
of such concrete synthesis—a realization due to decision, limitation, 
restriction—an attainment of “value” (94). Here, ‘value’ refers primarily to 
a certain pattern, that is to say, it refers to a definite concrete way in which 
all beings (both actual and ideal) are together within an actual occasion. 
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The question which must now be addressed is, how such concretion 
actually takes place. 
4. Types of entry, and the “graded envisagement” 
The relationship of an actual occasion a to an other occasion b, concerns 
the way b is present in a, it concerns b’s way of entry into a, as Whitehead 
says. Although the variety of types of ways in which other occasions can 
enter into a particular actual occasion a, that is to say, into the “experience 
which is a,” is unfathomable, Whitehead distinguishes two fundamental 
types of such relationships (175). In the first type, the actual occasion (a) is 
considered on the side of its full concreteness (cf. 170, 175-176), in the 
second, the occasion is also considered in respect to its cognitive 
experience. Thus, the first type concerns the actual occasion as merely a 
physical event, the second considers the actual occasion as a complete 
event, that is, as an event including its mental functioning (cf. 170-171, 
176). 
First fundamental type of entry. According to Whitehead, a full 
conceptual description of the real essence of an actual occasion is 
impossible. That is to say, the real essence of an actual occasion cannot 
completely be described by means of a finite abstractive hierarchy of 
eternal objects (‘finite’ in the sense that the abstractive hierarchy stops at a 
finite grade of complexity) (167-170). Indeed, the real essence of an actual 
occasion entails an infinite abstractive hierarchy of eternal objects (169). 
An infinite abstractive hierarchy also involves the spatio-temporal relations 
(of a to the occasions entrant in a). Time and temporal differentiations are 
essential aspects of an actual occasion, which always exhibits itself as a 
process, as a becomingness. Thus, the types of entry of other actual 
occasions into the essence of a, may be differentiated according to different 
definitions of past, present, or future: The new occasion organizes itself 
from other occasions that collectively form its past (176). But, even when it 
is completely determined by its past, it forms itself as a new re-enactment 
in its present in relation to which it is completely free. And it forms itself in 
the light of its future: the synthesis in a of eternal objects felt as not-
realized and as requiring for their realization the passage from a to 
subsequent actual occasions. 
Second fundamental type of entry. This last reflection leads us to 
Whitehead’s discussion of a second fundamental type of entry (which is 
especially important for the topic of this chapter, viz. the requirement of a 
Principle of Concretion). 
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In his discussion of the first type of entry, Whitehead pays attention only 
to an actual occasion in its full concreteness (170). In his discussion of the 
second type of entry, he pays explicit attention to the fact that a complete 
occasion also includes occasions as remembered, or anticipated, or 
imagined, or thought. These “mentally” included elements can be 
characterized by the “abrupt” realization of finite eternal objects, which is 
to say that they can be exhaustively described by means of a finite complex 
concept (171). Such a description either involves a reference to the eternal 
objects describing the abstract essences of the entered actual occasions 
(entered, for instance, as remembered or as anticipated), or it involves a 
reference to these eternal objects in their relatedness to the other eternal 
objects that are not realized in that occasion (176). 
This last remark needs some explanation. According to Whitehead: “[A]n 
actual event is an achievement for its own sake, a grasping of diverse 
entities into a value by reason of their real togetherness in that pattern, to 
the exclusion of other entities” (104). The exclusion here intended is an 
essential condition of value — “Restriction is the price of value” (178) — 
and entails the link between value and finitude: “The infinite has no 
properties. All value is the gift of finitude which is the necessary condition 
for activity” (MG 674). ‘Value’ therefore always involves the inclusion of 
certain eternal objects and the exclusion of others. More accurately, this 
inclusion or exclusion of eternal objects regards the individual essences of 
these eternal objects (e.g., something is red, not blue) (159), but the 
inclusion of one eternal object (A) qua individual essence (e.g., red) entails 
the inclusion of “the complete determinate relatedness of [that eternal 
object] A to every other eternal object, or set of eternal objects” (e.g., the 
inclusion of ‘red’ entails the ingression of not-yellow, not-blue, color, 
extension, etc.) (162). 
As a result of this determinate relatedness of the eternal object A to every 
other eternal object, any ingression of A into an actual occasion a involves 
the graded realization of all other eternal objects in that same occasion 
according to their relationships to A (cf. 161). Therefore, every eternal 
object is in some sense ingredient in each occasion. An eternal object is 
either ingredient as what it is in itself, that is as “individual essence” (159), 
or it is indirectly ingredient through its “relational essence,” that is, by its 
relationships to those eternal objects that are individually included (160). 
Thus, an eternal object B may, in virtue of its individual essence be 
excluded from a particular aesthetic synthesis, so that its presence in the 
event is but an “unfulfilled alternative” (162). But Whitehead also leaves 
room for gradations between total inclusion and total exclusion of eternal 
objects in respect of their individual essence. Such intermediate 
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possibilities are said to be alternatives that, though unfulfilled, are as such 
nevertheless aesthetically relevant. Such is the case, for instance, in 
examples taken from art, literature, or criticism based on unfulfilled ideals, 
where the important role of precisely non-realized possibilities may appear 
in various ways (158-159, 162; PR 185). 
Thus, even though each individual actual entity is what it is in virtue of 
exclusion, the value of such entity, its realization of a pattern, can be 
stipulated only by involving its (complex) relations to all entities: “Each 
actual entity is an arrangement of the whole universe, actual and ideal, 
whereby there is constituted that self-value which is the entity itself” (RM 
98). And again: “An organism is the realisation of a definite shape of value. 
The emergence of some actual value depends on limitation which excludes 
neutralising cross-lights. Thus an event is a matter of fact which by reason 
of its limitation is a value for itself; but by reason of its very nature it also 
requires the whole universe in order to be itself” (194). 
In the case of the mental phenomena mentioned above — like memory, 
anticipation, imagination, or thought —, the realization of the finite eternal 
objects involved entails, as we have seen above, the “full sweep of eternal 
relatedness,” i.e., the relatedness to all eternal objects, in various gradations 
of realization. Whitehead terms this “realized extension of eternal 
relatedness” (which is here an “abrupt realization”) the “graded 
envisagement” which each occasion prehends into its synthesis (176). 
The inclusion of this graded envisagement is what makes a new occasion 
‘feel’ (a term used by Whitehead in Process and Reality) possibilities of 
togetherness. By providing a feeling of what (in one sense) is not-being, the 
graded envisagement is the source of error, but also of truth, art, ethics, and 
religion. The inclusion of this graded envisagement confronts fact with 
alternatives (176-177). 
Having said this, Whitehead pursues his explanation in a text in which he 
characterizes the envisagement as a conditioning of the synthesizing 
activity, and then further analyzes this conditioning or limiting, and 
concludes that, apart from other forms of limitation, an antecedent 
limitation among values is required. Then, in order to make this 
conceivable, Whitehead postulates a principle of limitation as an “attribute” 
of the substantial activity, and bluntly states that “God is the ultimate 
limitation” (178). 
This very condensed line of thought will now be the subject of a far more 
detailed discussion. 
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5. The late introduction of ‘God’: God as the supreme ground 
for limitation 
In the last part of Chapter XI, Whitehead analyzes the requirements for a 
metaphysical understanding of the puzzling fact that there is an actual but 
contingent course of events. Previously, in Chapter VI (which unlike 
Chapter XI is based on the original text of the Lowell Lectures) Whitehead 
had already considered the general flux of events, and there his analysis 
had led him to speak of an “underlying eternal energy” or “underlying 
activity” to which he attributed three types of envisagement: “These are: 
first, the envisagement of eternal objects; secondly, the envisagement of 
possibilities of value in respect to the synthesis of eternal objects; and 
lastly, the envisagement of the actual matter of fact which must enter into 
the total situation which is achievable by the addition of the future” (105). 
Thus, in the text of Chapter VI Whitehead attributes “the envisagement of 
possibilities of value” to the nature of the underlying activity, and 
elaborates this as follows: “[I]n the nature of the eternal activity there must 
stand an envisagement of all values to be obtained by a real togetherness of 
eternal objects, as envisaged in ideal situations. Such ideal situations, apart 
from any reality, are devoid of intrinsic value, but are valuable as elements 
in purpose” (105). Contrary to the text of Chapter XI analyzed above (176-
177) in which the inclusion of graded envisagement is related to error, 
truth, art, ethics, religion and alternatives, but not to purpose, here in the 
‘earlier’ text, Whitehead does link envisagement of possibilities directly to 
values and purpose, as indeed he will also do in his later Process and 
Reality where this thought is taken up again and further elaborated. 
Considering the fact that, when in Process and Reality Whitehead discusses 
God’s primordial nature — the source of the initial purpose of each new 
event —, he explicitly refers to the “graded envisagement” paragraph from 
Chapter XI (176-177), I think we are justified to conclude that the SMW 
176-177 paragraph also connotes the aspect of value and purpose. 
Moreover, this would clarify the otherwise obscure transition in the 
Chapter XI text from a reference to “graded envisagement” to standards of 
value as principle of limitation to a reference to God as the supreme ground 
for limitation. 
Now, let us take a closer look at the text following 176-177, that is, at the 
text of 177-178. Whitehead’s paragraph begins with the following 
statement: “This general concept, of an event as a process whose outcome 
is a unit of experience, points to the analysis of an event into (i) substantial 
activity, (ii) conditioned potentialities which are there for synthesis, and 
(iii) the achieved outcome of the synthesis” (177). Whitehead seems to 
argue that because each event is a novel event, the past occasions are 
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“conditioned potentialities” waiting to be synthesized (ii). However, 
because the synthesis of those conditioned potentialities also requires the 
ingression of eternal objects, he adds in a passage a few lines below that 
“[t]he envisagement which enters into the synthesis is also a character 
which conditions the synthesising activity” (177). 
Whitehead then continues with a thorough analysis of the notion of 
limitation. As we have mentioned above, Whitehead is convinced that the 
becoming of an actual occasion is directly due to limitation or exclusion. 
He conceives actuality as in essential relation to an unfathomable 
possibility: it is “a limitation imposed on possibility” (174). In other words, 
concretion as the becoming of actuality requires a limitation with respect to 
the indefinite plurality of possibilities. To quote Ivor Leclerc: “[It] entails a 
definite limitation of possibility to ‘a this,’ which entails a standard in 
terms of which that limitation is effected.”1 This explains that in his search 
for a principle of concretion, Whitehead in chapter XI comes to speak of a 
‘principle of limitation’ or of the ‘supreme ground for limitation.’ 
So, Whitehead’s analysis of limitation is of the utmost importance for our 
topic. Apart from the trivial limitation of particulars (each mode is this and 
not that), Whitehead distinguishes two main limitations with regard to 
individualization, viz. a limitation of antecedent selection (concerning 
logical and causal relationships and the particularity of the actual course of 
events) (177), and an antecedent limitation regarding values. The latter 
limitation means that “[t]here cannot be value without antecedent standards 
of value” (178). This claim is based on the consideration that such 
antecedent standards of value are needed in order to discriminate the 
acceptance or rejection of the diverse possibilities that can be actualized 
(178). 
And this leads Whitehead to remark that: “Thus as a further element in the 
metaphysical situation, there is required a principle of limitation” (178). 
The text itself does not make clear whether this principle is the ground of 
both the “limitation of antecedent selection” and of the “limitation among 
values” or only of the latter, but the remainder of the chapter strongly 
suggests that Whitehead is interested primarily in the latter (even though in 
the end this distinction may prove to be futile2). Whitehead jumps, in a not 
overly transparent way, from “[T]here is required a principle of limitiation” 
(178), to the statement “[W]e must provide a ground for limitation which 
stands among the attributes of the substantial activity. This attribute 
provides the limitation for which no reason can be given: for all reason 
flows from it. God is the ultimate limitation” (178), and then again at the 
end, to the conception of God “as the supreme ground for limitation” (179). 
Thus, even though he never says so explicitly, there is the inevitable 
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suggestion that Whitehead sees God as the required principle of concretion 
in virtue of his being a principle of limitation, and, more precisely, of his 
being the supreme principle of (or ground for) limitation.3 
We have seen already that Whitehead speaks of a “graded envisagement 
(of eternal objects)” which is, among other things, a source of alternatives 
for the novel actual occasion (176-177). Now Whitehead conceives God as 
a principle of limitation which, as an antecedent limitation among values, 
introduces contraries, grades, and oppositions, and enables discrimination 
in the acceptance or rejection of possibilities (178). Whitehead does not say 
anything explicitly about the relationship between the function of principle 
of limitation and the function of envisagement, although there is the 
suggestion that they in fact coincide. As John Cobb sees it: “This 
envisagement [of eternal objects] is not something additional to his 
function as principle of limitation, but it explains how that principle 
operates,” for: “the way in which God functions as the principle of 
limitation is by ordering the infinite possibilities of the eternal objects 
according to principles of value.”4 Cobb’s interpretation is based on ideas 
derived from Whitehead’s later work, especially Process and Reality. And, 
as I have argued above, Whitehead justifies this by providing an explicit 
link to SMW 176-177 in a text on the divine primordial nature in Process 
and Reality (PR 189). 
6. The nature and the working of this principle of limitation: 
An essay in elucidation by some imaginative leaps 
The purpose of what follows is to offer an interpretation of this principle 
of limitation, by making use of some texts from Process and Reality and 
especially by making some comparisons with more mathematically based 
examples. 
The principle of limitation or of concretion which the text of Chapter XI 
speaks of, together with the idea of the graded envisagement of the eternal 
objects, comes back in Process and Reality as one of the ways in which 
Whitehead refers to God’s so-called “primordial nature” (PR 164, 244, 
345), which he describes as “the unconditioned conceptual valuation of the 
entire multiplicity of eternal objects” (PR 31). To this last phrase, he adds: 
“By reason of this complete valuation, the objectification of God in each 
derivate actual entity results in a graduation of the relevance of eternal 
objects to the concrescent phases of that derivate occasion” (PR 31, italics 
added). Similar remarks may be found in a number of other passages. Thus, 
he writes: “In this sense God is the principle of concretion; namely, he is 
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that actual entity from which each temporal concrescence receives that 
initial aim from which its self-causation starts. That aim determines the 
initial gradations of relevance of eternal objects for conceptual feeling” 
(PR 244, italics added). And in yet another passage: “The limitation 
whereby there is a perspective relegation of eternal objects to the 
background is the characteristic of decision. Transcendent decision 
includes God’s decision. He is the actual entity in virtue of which the entire 
multiplicity of eternal objects obtains its graded relevance to each stage of 
concrescence” (PR 164, italics added). And again: “[…] the primordial 
nature of God, which is his complete envisagement of eternal objects” (PR 
44, italics added). 
From these and other texts one may safely conclude that the graded 
envisagement of possibilities, the valuation of possibilities, the antecedent 
limitation by standards of value, the principle of limitation and God as 
primordial nature are all closely interconnected, and that there is an 
intimate kinship between the prehension of the graded envisagement 
(featuring also, as we have argued above, aspects of value and purpose) and 
the prehension of God’s primordial nature which provides the initial aim. 
In what follows we will make use of this connection in a further 
exploration of the nature and function of God as principle of limitation in 
relation to the concrete and contingent flux of events. 
In speaking of a valuation of all possibilities, Whitehead does not mean an 
absolute valuation of the possibilities (in the sense that, for instance, red 
would be absolutely good, or green absolutely bad), but a relative 
valuation, that is to say, a valuation of the possibilities in relation to every 
possible initial state of a new event, in other words, in relation to every 
possible set of entities available for integration in a new occasion. This is 
why Whitehead speaks of a “relative relevance” (PR 344). In SMW too, he 
says explicitly that the envisagement of values does not signify an intrinsic 
value: “Such ideal situations, apart from any reality, are devoid of intrinsic 
value” (SMW 105). 
Simply put, what Whitehead means by God’s ordering of possibilities 
according to relative relevance may be read as follows: if, in a given 
situation, the possibilities A, B, C, D and E present themselves as 
prehensible, then, given this combination, A may best be valued in this 
way, B in that way etc., so as to achieve a synthesis with a maximum effect 
of aesthetic intensity, whereas in relation to another possible supply of 
possibilities the valuation for A, B etc. will be different. Thus, all 
possibilities have a specific valuation in relation to every possible supply of 
possibilities. 
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Harking back to the above given example of the mosaic may give some 
access to what Whitehead means by such ordering.5 For instance, given a 
certain supply of many mosaic stones, the best possibility of realization 
into a mosaic (in other words, the manner of prehending into synthesis that 
yields the highest aesthetic intensity) is, for example: letting the little green 
pieces form the foreground pattern while keeping the remainder of the 
stones for a mixed background (cf. PR 164) (which is something like the 
‘graded envisagement’ of our text — SMW 176). But, given another 
combination of available pieces, the best possibility of synthesis is, for 
instance: give a foreground function to the red and yellow little stones and 
spread all the green stones among all the remaining ones diffusely into the 
background. Thus a valuation is conceivable of all possibilities in relation 
to every possible supply of possibilities, that is, a valuation of possibilities 
in relation to each other. 
This elucidation may be presented somewhat more formally by making 
use of the image of a mathematical function F attaching (mapping) a 
specific y to every possible x.6 In this image the letter F signifies —
 obviously mutatis mutandis — the divine principle of limitation or of 
concretion, which is the unchanging valuative ordering of all potentialities 
in respect of each other: if x1 then y1, if x2 then y2 etc. The x signifies the 
variable possible initial situation of an actual occasion (the possible “actual 
world”) being composed of many data to be synthesized, and the y stands 
for the ‘the most valuable possibility for synthesis of these data’ (cf. what is 
called the “initial aim” in PR 244, and the “graded envisagement which 
each new occasion prehends into its synthesis” in SMW 176). 
Thus, mathematically expressed, F is to be seen as something that more or 
less resembles an optimization function. It is important to emphasize that 
both x and y stand for possibilities: respectively, the possible initial 
situation containing a multiplicity of data, and the best possibility for 
synthesis of these data. Thus, F (‘the divine principle of concretion’), in a 
valuative optimizing way, relates potentialities to each other. It should also 
be noted that this F itself is atemporal and unchanging (Whitehead’s term 
“valuation” corresponds to my ‘F’), whereas the y, the initial aim or 
“graded envisagement,” is temporal and changing in relation to, and in 
dependence on the x (Whitehead’s term ‘evaluation’ corresponds to this 
temporal y). In ‘Immortality,’ his last publication, Whitehead expresses this 
as follows: “But Evaluation [cf. the y] always presupposes abstraction from 
the sheer immediacy of fact [cf. the x]: It involves reference to Valuation 
[cf. the F].”7 
This mathematical image may be helpful in elucidating how God, as 
principle of limitation, as the relative valuation of all potentialities, can 
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influence the worldly processes: given a certain initial state (a certain x), 
God’s valuation (the function F) delivers the best combinatory possibility 
for that case (a particular y). And the nascent event feels this aim in 
prehending this “graded envisagement.” But please note that in Process 
and Reality y is not the actual outcome, not the actual next step, but only 
the starting point, the initial aim of the new event, “from which its self-
causation starts” (PR 244). 
Let us now, in the light of the above, go back to our text of Chapter XI. 
Here Whitehead argues that the general modal individualization is limited 
in two ways. The first sort of limitation is a limitation by the actual course 
of events, “which might be otherwise so far as concerns eternal possibility, 
but is that course” (177). This limitation takes three forms — logical 
conditions, causal conditions, and particularization — which Whitehead 
summarizes as “limitation of antecedent selection.” I suggest that this 
stands for the x in the above given mathematical analogy. 
The second sort of limitation is limitation by conformation to a standard. 
Restriction is the price of value (‘value’ here in the sense of being 
something concrete, a concrete pattern of togetherness). There cannot be 
‘value’ (in the sense of a concrete individual content of a variable 
possibility — cf. the expression “the variable x has the value 5”) without an 
antecedent standard of value that enables discrimination in the acceptance 
or rejection of different possibilities. My suggestion is that this standard of 
value is — very roughly — represented by the F in the above given 
mathematical analogy, where F resembles an optimization function that 
relates possibilities to possibilities, indicating what in a concrete situation is 
the most valuable option. 
For the purpose of getting a better ‘feeling’ for the ‘interactive’ way in 
which such mathematical function operates in relation to concrete 
processes, a brief excursion may be useful here. Let us compare (again with 
all the shortcomings that are inherent to examples) the principle of 
concretion with an interactive computer program (e.g., a football or a 
computer assisted drawing (CAD) program).8 The program is a complex 
but unchangeable ‘algorithm’ (a file on your hard disc) that allows for an 
infinite variety of concrete courses the game may take. The player’s 
choices determine what specific situation will emerge, the computer file 
has no foreknowledge of that situation, but its reaction will always provide 
‘the best possible option.’ The program file is a possibility structure: for 
each possible situation, it has a correspondingly optimal option. And 
because the ‘best possibility’ it provides is contingent upon a concrete 
situation occasioned by the user of the program, the efficacy of the program 
is eminently ‘interactive.’ Clearly therefore, in spite of the constancy of the 
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program, the course of the game is never fixed from the outset. Every new 
course will be different. 
The divine principle of concretion may be compared, mutatis mutandis, to 
such computer program inasmuch as, like the computer program, it is both 
immutable and ignorant of the situations that will present themselves, yet it 
always offers the ‘best possibility’ for every given contingent situation. 
And as no game can be played without the program, so too there can be no 
world without the divine principle of concretion. 
Finally, I would like to take the example just one step further by 
comparing for the sake of the argument God’s role as principle of 
concretion with the role of a ‘criterion function’ in adaptive systems.9 
Adaptive self-organizing processes are processes that develop and change 
their internal structure adaptively in relation to their respective 
environment. Such processes often involve an implicit criterion, such as a 
criterion of minimum energy use, or of optimal mutual distance, or of 
maximum benefit. For instance, biological evolution involves a ‘fitness 
function,’ which expresses the different fitness values of the many possible 
genotypes of a species in relation to the environment. In natural systems 
such ‘criterion function’ is not external to the system, it expresses the 
immanent fact that, given a certain kind of environment, one solution fits 
better (produces more fertile offspring, for example) than another. Complex 
self-organizing processes often involve such ‘criterion function’ (or ‘credit 
assignment algorithm’ to use John Holland’s term10) as an immanent 
valuation principle. That is to say, such processes involve something that 
discriminates a development in one direction as more attractive than a 
development in a different direction, so that one is felt to be more 
beneficial than the other. And this difference in attractiveness comes to 
give an orientation to the course of the process. 
This function or algorithm is mostly hidden because in natural processes it 
operates in an immanent way. In artificial processes however, the criterion 
function must be invented and built in as the condition for the operation of 
the system. Thus, an artificial intelligence device, a learning robot, for 
example, requires the explicit creation and implementation of a ‘fitness 
function’ that, in the form of a computer program, functions as a valuation 
principle distinguishing better from worse solutions.11 My suggestion 
therefore is that Whitehead’s concept of the principle of concretion may be 
understood as somewhat similar to such fitness function.12 And this 
suggestion seems to nicely concur with Whitehead’s remark that: “Mere 
blind appetition would be the product of chance and could lead nowhere. 
[…] There is a discrimination of appetitions according to a rule of fitness” 
(FR 89-90). 
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7. By way of conclusion 
Whitehead’s metaphysical train of thought led him in Chapter XI of 
Science and the Modern World to the conclusion that a Principle of 
Concretion is required. But he insists that he wants this claim to derive 
from metaphysics itself: “For nothing, within any limited type of 
experience, can give intelligence to shape our ideas of any entity at the base 
of all actual things, unless the general character of things requires that there 
be such an entity” (173-174). In this ‘dispassionate attitude’ he feels a 
kinship with Aristotle: “[Aristotle] was entirely dispassionate; and he is the 
last European metaphysician of first-rate importance for whom this claim 
can be made” (173). Like Aristotle who, though starting from a cosmology 
that is now considered erroneous, argues the necessity of a Prime Mover, 
so Whitehead, starting from a contemporary cosmology, analogously 
argues the necessity of a Principle of Concretion. According to Whitehead, 
this principle is required in order to be able to account for the general 
implications of the course of actual occasions (174). 
The analysis has shown that this requirement is intrinsically related to the 
two perspectives from which an actual occasion is to be considered, 
respectively, as the achievement of a togetherness of all actual occasions, 
and as the achievement of a togetherness of eternal objects (175). These 
two perspectives correspond, respectively, to the questions ‘What does the 
occasion create itself from?’ and ‘How does the occasion create itself?’ 
(which in some sense may be compared with Aristotle’s matter and form 
distinction). The former perspective refers to other actual occasions, the 
latter to eternal objects or, more specifically, “to an envisagement of all 
values to be obtained by a real togetherness of eternal objects” (105). The 
duality appears again when Whitehead argues that, next to a limitation of 
antecedent selection, an antecedent limitation among values is required. It 
brings him to the conclusion, that as a further element in the metaphysical 
situation, there is required a “principle of limitation,” which he ultimately 
signifies as “God.” 
In the previous section, where by some imaginative leaps I have 
endeavored to elucidate the text of Chapter XI, I have expressed the 
conviction that the image of a mathematical function, especially in the form 
of an optimization function or a criterion function (fitness function), is to 
some extent analogous with Whitehead’s ideas on God as principle of 
concretion or limitation. 
The comparison may clarify several paradoxes regarding God as principle 
of concretion (or, in terms of Process and Reality, God as primordial) in 
relation to the world. It may clarify that, as such, God is immutable and 
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nevertheless is the ground for the changeability of the world; that God is a 
definite matter of fact and nevertheless the condition for the contingent 
course of the actual world; that God is without (fore)knowledge of the 
world and nevertheless provides every worldly situation with the optimal 
option for its concretion; that God does not participate in the ‘game’ of the 
world, and nevertheless is a necessary condition for the becoming and the 
course of the concrete world by distinguishing better from worse solutions. 
For Whitehead, there is no doubt that without such principle of limitation, 
no particular ‘how,’ no particularization of the course of actuality is 
conceivable. As he sees it, this leaves us with only two possible choices: 
Either we deny the reality of actual occasions as different from each other 
and we consider the actual concrete course of events as an illusion, or we 
admit to a metaphysics that allows for such principle, and we thus give 
credit to the contingency and the reality of the multifarious evolving world. 
Whitehead clearly opts for the latter alternative (178). 
Finally, Whitehead’s adoption of a principle of concretion at the base of 
all actual things should not be understood as implying the assertion that this 
principle explains everything. Indeed, Whitehead thinks such idea would be 
foolish. For God as principle of limitation may be a necessary condition, 
but does not provide a sufficient explanation. For, evidently, the ‘F’ (the 
principle of limitation) does not yield anything without a reference to some 
particular ‘x’ (the concrete antecedent course of events). Whitehead refuses 
to pay God the metaphysical compliment (or insult) of being the sole 
source of the world and of its actual course. Certainly, one of the reasons 
for this refusal is that he wants to avoid making God responsible for all 
good and all evil. Contrary to the classical conception according to which 
God is made to be the creator of everything, Whitehead conceives God as 
the supreme ground for the division between Good and Evil (179). The 
comparison with something like an optimization or criterion function as 
elaborated in the previous section may contribute to a better understanding 
of how a preferential distinction between better and worse options makes 
possible “the puzzling fact” of the occurrence of a contingent actual course 
of concrete events. 
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Notes 
 
1 Ivor Leclerc 1985. 
2 After reading section 7 it may become obvious that this is an improper 
question. In the light of that section one may argue that the 
limitation of antecedent selection and the antecedent limitation 
among values correspond or go hand in hand with, respectively, the 
x and the F in the proposed mathematical analogy. If this 
interpretation is accepted, it appears that x cannot be seen 
independently from F. This is related to the fact that Whitehead 
holds a process view in which the advance of time is an essential 
part of the picture. This entails that the data of the actual world 
from which the novel event forms itself (x), were themselves 
becoming events at an earlier moment, at which time they too came 
to be under the influence of the limitation by virtue of the 
antecedent standards of value, that is, under the influence of God as 
principle of limitation (F). Therefore, far from being a self-
subsisting factor that would be independent from F, the x itself 
became dependent on the same F (and, of course, on an previous x). 
Hence the limitation by antecedent selection cannot be seen as 
disconnected from the antecedent limitation among values. 
3 This means that in the remainder of the text the expressions ‘principle of 
concretion’ and ‘principle of limitation’ will be considered to be 
logically equivalent. 
4 Cobb 1965, 145-146. 
5 Cf. Oomen 2003a, 97. 
6 Cf. Oomen 1998, 330; 2003a, 97. 
7 Whitehead [1941]1951, 685. 
8 Cf. Oomen 2002, 11. 
9 The more usual technical term for such ‘criterion function’ is ‘fitness 
function,’ an expression that is not confined to the context of 
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biological fitness alone. However, in order to avoid serious 
misunderstanding, I prefer to use in the text the more neutral 
expression ‘criterion function.’ A fitness function may be 
understood as a mathematical representation of freedom and 
direction, it is a mapping rule that basically assigns a direction 
(attractiveness, preference) to a set of eligible possibilities, thereby 
enabling a process to organize itself adaptively. For more 
information about fitness functions and their place in adaptive 
systems, see e.g. Kauffman 1995, Holland 1996, Heylighen 1999.  
10 Holland 1996, 87. 
11 Heylighen 1999, 23. 
12 Cf. Oomen 2003b, 384. 
